Most philosophers and political scientists readily admit that Thomas Hobbes is a significant figure in the history of political thought. His theory was, arguably, one of the first to provide a justification for political legitimacy from the perspective of each individual subject. What has been largely missing in the literature, however, is the application of Hobbesian theory to a variety of current issues in both public policy and applied ethics. The essays in this volume, written by some of the top (...) Hobbesian scholars in the world, provide fresh perspectives on a litany of intransigent local, political, and international issues in applied ethics and public policy. The topics addressed in _Hobbesian Applied Ethics and Public Policy _include the right to die, abortion, same-sex marriage, free speech, terrorism, and international justice. This book will be of interest to Hobbesian scholars, as well as those interested in contemporary issues in applied ethics, political philosophy, and public policy. (shrink)

Star Trek is a series of philosophical thought experiments that challenges viewers to arrive at consistent positions about some of life's toughest questions. It isn't an exaggeration to say that, with very few exceptions, Star Trek has done more to teach audiences about the nuances of reality, science, morality, and friendship than any other show in the history of television. Casuistry is a method of analysis that makes use of case studies, either real or fictional; in order to examine what (...) should happen in similar real‐life situations. The combination of science and fiction creates three virtues that Star Trek's creative team pushes to their boundaries in order to constantly engage viewers to be active watchers and thinkers. This chapter considers two prime examples of Star Trek's use of casuistry to make tangible contributions to important philosophical discussions. (shrink)

A collection of twenty-three essays examining the philosophical themes of the animated cartoon show about life in the year 3000, Futurama.

A collection of twenty-three essays examining the philosophical themes of the animated cartoon show about life in the year 3000, Futurama.

Red Rising and Philosophy has gathered together a crew of the wisest Helldivers philosophy can offer. Could humanity's love of physical enhancements cause its extinction? Do people doom humanity by trying to all be the same? Can a person love someone, while at the same time wanting that person destroyed? Is equality always the best principle on which to organize society? What is evil, and how does it exist in contemporary life? Does one remain the same person, even after changing (...) every physical aspect of one's body?Is it moral to sell oneself into slavery, whether it's through sex or manual labor? Is it ethical to sell one's children into slavery, on the promise that their children will live in peace and tranquility? These questions and more are what make Brown'sRed Rising trilogy such an impactful story. Brown pulls no punches, and philosophy works best in such an environment.Red Rising and Philosophy is not for the timid or the faint at heart. It's notThe Passage, since no one will die from reading it, but reading it could be a life-changing experience. (shrink)

Over the last few years we have had a debate regarding the role of government in providing healthcare. There has been a question as to whether or not the state's proper role requires protection of its subjects from the calamities associated with a lack of healthcare. In this article, I will argue that straightforward Hobbesian principles require the state to provide healthcare. It might seem odd that such a positive right can be justified by a philosopher who famously conceives of (...) individuals as motivated by self-interest. Nonetheless, Hobbes's political theory provides the framework for such a right. (shrink)

Hobbesian accounts of public reason are forced to face a tension that is presented for any theorist that toes the Hobbesian line. This tension has been referred to as the “Hobbesian Dilemma.” On one horn, we are afraid that we might create a monster with our authorization of an absolute sovereign. On the other horn, we are afraid that if we do not hand over unlimited power to the sovereign we will not be freed from the conflict that is endemic (...) to our reliance upon private pluralistic standards. These Hobbesians, stressing the first horn, are afraid of authorizing a supreme political entity, so they provide modifications that serve to restrict such an entity. Such modifications, however, necessarily reintroduce pluralism back into the commonwealth. But if we take Hobbes seriously and accept that pluralism generates a state of war, the reintroduction of pluralism must be viewed as disastrous. (shrink)

The corporate scandals of the twenty-first century have necessitated ethical behavior as a major component of the organizational process. These scandals occurred despite the ethical rules and laws in place, implying that rules and laws might not be effective in ensuring the ethical behavior of organizational participants at all times. Hence, a better approach to handling ethical decisions may be virtue ethics which demand the building of ethical character that intrinsically drives ethical behavior. Prudence was studied as a virtue which (...) builds character and can moderate ethical behavior. The moderating role of prudence was studied in the context of organizational political behavior. Employee political behavior in organizations can have either positive or negative consequences; hence, it is in the realm of ethical decision-making. Since studies have not identified how individuals can self-regulate their desire for political behavior, the study proposed political prudence, a character-building virtue, as a self-regulating variable which can be used by individuals to avoid drifting to the dark side of political behavior. The study participants were drawn from three organizations in Lagos, Nigeria, and a cross-sectional research design was adopted for data collection. The results confirmed that political prudence moderated the effects of political will on political behavior such that individuals engaged in benevolent political will and avoided self-serving political will. The importance of the findings is that organizations have a means of steering participants away from the dark side to the bright side of political behavior which is useful for productivity. (shrink)

The motivation of this paper is to contribute to the project of finding new ways to use "utopia" in philosophy again. Since philosophers as well as poets can look to their forbears for inspiration in re-inventing terms, it would be nice if those of us trying to rehabilitate the term could lean a bit on our own disciplinary heavies, especially in the current climate of philosophical skepticism, even cynicism, about the very idea of utopia. My contribution to that task here (...) will be to present a vision of utopian commitment that I see taking shape in the interface between Kant's ethics and aesthetics. This vision is broadly speaking a moral one, insofar as it describe the barriers to, but also the necessary conditions of, human motivation to strive for the creation of a just society in the real world. But turning to Kant's ethics as a model for a theory of utopia requires some explanation. After all, his moral theory, when it takes into account the really existing conditions of human existence, appears to do so only to dismiss them as obstacles or diversions in the path of correct moral judgment. When he discusses human community, it is often to dismiss it as driven by self-interest and and an "each against all" struggle that can be responsibly regulated but never eliminated. At best this "unsocial sociability" might be evidence for a hypothetical natural purpose: human strife and misery is a mechanical force driving the progress of our talents and capacities in the long evolutionary run.1 But this is hardly a utopian vision in the sense in which we would wish to see a well-regulated society be.. (shrink)

Hobbes advocates 'thin absolutism'; a system of authority that merely ensures respect of the core concepts of sovereignty – hierarchy and normative closure. This new interpretation of Hobbes's absolutism shows that the concerns regarding sovereign tyranny are not fatal to his account of political authority. With thin absolutism, the sovereign is neither necessarily ineffective nor inherently dangerous. This, then, leaves Hobbesian absolutism in the position of being a 'reasonable contender'– a system of political authority that might require our allegiance, but (...) at the very least requires serious attention. (shrink)

This chapter examines some of Stone and Parker's “seepage,” looking at episodes that provide excellent cases of the core ideas of libertarianism. One reason for rejecting paternalism is that it causes unintended bad consequences. Libertarians argue that by legalizing illicit substances, supply will increase and, as a result, crime will decrease. Another way to argue in favor of libertarianism is based on the idea that each individual is a rational agent and, because of this, their decisions should be respected. One (...) must be clear when discussing what it means to “respect an individual's agency.” We must respect people because they are autarchic, but not necessarily because of their autonomy. We don't hold non‐autarchic people fully responsible for their actions, nor should we allow them to be fully free from paternalistic influence. (shrink)

Hobbes’s political and ethical theories are rarely viewed as places by which those who protect the weak seek refuge. It would seem odd, then, to suggest that such a theory might be able to protect the weakest among us—non-human animals. In this paper, however, I will defend the possibility of a Hobbesian justification for animal rights. The Hobbesian response to the problem of compliance allows contractarianism to extend (at least some) normative protection to animals. Such protection, as I will argue, (...) has a similar justificational foundation as the protection we offer other humans. (shrink)

In an article that appeared in American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Kody Cooper argued that “to be a Hobbesian is to be prolife.” In this essay, I will provide an argument that rebuts Cooper’s prolife interpretation of Hobbes. First, I will argue that Cooper has, without argument, committed an equivocation between a person’s personal identity and his or her organism. Resolving this ambiguity would allow for an interpretation of Hobbes that can consistently reject the notion that the life of a person (...) “begins at conception.” Second, I will show that Cooper fails to take into account the significant costs that are placed upon prospective mothers and is therefore not able to judge whether or not aborting a fetus is within a mother’s enlightened self-interest. Third, I will, contrary to Cooper, show why it may be acceptable for a Hobbesian sovereign to construct a legal regime that is permissive of abortion. (shrink)

Grotius’s attempt to find a compromise both between reason and revelation, and between free will and predestination, his philological approach to the reading of Scripture, his refusal to engage in doctrinal disputes, and his insistence on ethics as the core of Christian teaching, were increasingly important in shaping a powerful strand of thinking about the Anglican church from the Great Tew circle to post-Restoration latitudinarianism. The references to Grotius’s apologetic work which appeared in moderate Anglican writing should be understood by (...) setting them in a broader context encompassing the settlement of Anglican Church, its religious doctrine, and its relations with civil authority. In order to recover the complexity of the political and ecclesiological context for the English translations of De Veritate , I will divide the period from 1632 to 1686 into three distinct phases: the initial phase goes back to the 1630s, when the members of the Great Tew circle at Oxford facilitated the circulation of the early translations and editions of De Veritate in England within the context of Caroline/Laudian religious policy. The second covers the 1650s, when a number of Grotius’s works were translated by the Anglican theologian Clement Barksdale in order to provide a new ideology for the post-Laudian Anglican Church. The third phase spans from the Restoration until 1686, when De Veritate converged in the complex political and intellectual background of ‘latitudinarianism’. (shrink)